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                        __________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
     This is an appeal from the dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
of claims 
brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act attacking the multi-billion dollar 
national 
tobacco settlement.  Endeavoring to recoup billions of dollars in public 
health care costs 
and to reduce cigarette smoking, several states brought suit against the 
leading United 
States tobacco manufacturers.  In view of the magnitude of potential 
liability and the 
prospect of multiple actions, the parties asked Congress to resolve the 
suits through a 
national legislative remedy.  After congressional efforts stalled, forty-
six states forged a 
settlement with the tobacco manufacturers known as the Multistate 
Settlement 
Agreement.  Plaintiffs, who are cigarette wholesalers, challenge the 
Multistate Settlement 
Agreement as a violation of  1 and  2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.   
     The District Court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 
the Sherman 
Act because the tobacco companies were immune from antitrust liability 
under both the 
Noerr-Pennington and Parker immunity doctrines.  We agree they are immune 
under 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine but not under the Parker doctrine.  We will 
affirm.
                               I. 
                  Facts and Procedural History 
     A.D. Bedell, a cigarette wholesaler, brought this class action on 
behalf of itself 
and 900 similarly situated wholesalers seeking damages and a permanent 
injunction of 
the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  Defendants, Philip Morris, Inc., 
R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., Inc., and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., are cigarette 
manufacturers 
who were original signatories to the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  
Along with 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., the fourth largest cigarette producer, they are 
collectively known 
as the major tobacco companies or the Majors.  The Majors are responsible 
for 98% of 
cigarette sales in the United States.  Bedell, as a wholesaler, bought 
directly from the 
Majors.   
     In the mid 1990's, individual states commenced bringing law suits 
against the 
Majors to recoup healthcare costs and reduce smoking by minors.  As one 
state Attorney 
General declared, "'[The] lawsuit is premised on a simple notion: you 
caused the health 
crisis; you pay for it.'"  Janofsky, Mississippi Seeks Damages from 
Tobacco Companies, 
N.Y. Times, May 24, 1994, at A12 (quoting Mississippi Attorney General 
Mike Moore).  
The States alleged a wide range of deceptive and fraudulent practices by 
the tobacco 
companies over decades of sales.  Faced with the prospect of defending 
multiple 
actions nationwide, the Majors sought a congressional remedy, primarily in 
the form of a 
national legislative settlement.  In June 1997, the National Association 
of Attorneys 
General and the Majors jointly petitioned Congress for a global 
resolution.  
     The proposed congressional remedy (1997 National Settlement Proposal) 
for the 
cigarette tobacco problem resembled the eventual Multistate Settlement 
Agreement, but 
with important differences.  For example, although the congressional 
proposal would 
have earmarked 1/3 of all funds to combat teenage smoking, no such 
restrictions appear 
in the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  1997 National Settlement 
Proposal, Title VII, 
available at http://www.cnn.com/us/9705/tobacco/docs/proposal.html (last 
visited June 
18, 2001).  In addition, the congressional proposal would have mandated 
Food & Drug 
Administration oversight and imposed federal advertising restrictions.  It 
also would 
have granted immunity from state prosecutions; eliminated punitive damages 
in 
individual tort suits; and prohibited the use of class actions, or other 
joinder or 
aggregation devices without the defendant's consent, assuring that only 
individual 
actions could be brought.  See id. at Title V(A), VIII(A), VIII(B).  The 
congressional 
proposal called for payments to the States of $368.5 billion over twenty-
five years.  1997 
National Settlement Proposal, Title VI.  By contrast, assuming that the 
Majors would 
maintain their market share, the Multistate Settlement Agreement provides 
baseline 
payments of about $200 billion over twenty-five years.  See Multistate 
Settlement 
Agreement,  IX(a), (b), (c). 
     Significantly for our purposes, the congressional proposal included 
an explicit 
exemption from the federal antitrust laws.  See 1997 National Settlement 
Proposal, App. 
IV(C)(2) (stating cigarette manufacturers would have been permitted to 
"jointly confer, 
coordinate or act in concert, for this limited purpose [of achieving the 
goals of the 
settlement]").  The Multistate Settlement Agreement contains no 
corresponding 
exemption from the federal antitrust laws.   
     Congress rejected the proposed settlement in the spring of 1998.  
Undeterred, the 
State Attorneys General and the Majors continued to negotiate and on 
November 23, 
1998, they executed the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  Afterwards, 
twenty other 
tobacco manufacturers, representing 2% of the market, joined the 
settlement as 
Subsequent Participating Manufacturers (SPMs).  The addition of the 
Subsequent 
Participating Manufacturers meant that nearly all of the cigarette 
producers in the 
domestic market had signed the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  Their 
addition was 
significant.  The Majors allegedly feared that any cigarette manufacturer 
left out of a 
settlement (Non-Participating Manufacturers or NPMs) would be free to 
expand market 
share or could enter the market with lower prices, drastically altering 
the Majors' future 
profits and their ability to increase prices to pay for the settlement. 
     Plaintiffs brought suit challenging sections of the Multistate 
Settlement 
Agreement allegedly designed to maintain market share and restrict entry.  
The 
challenged sections of the Multistate Settlement Agreement are the so-
called "Renegade 
Clause," the settlement's primary mechanism for allocating payment 
responsibilities 
based on production levels, and the provision calling for "Qualifying 
Statutes," which are 
state laws passed as a result of commitments made in the Multistate 
Settlement 
Agreement that require Non-Participating Manufacturers to pay into state 
escrow 
accounts for each sale made.  Plaintiffs claim the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement and 
resulting state implementing statutes create an output cartel that imposes 
draconian 
monetary penalties for increasing cigarette production beyond 1998 levels 
and effectively 
bars new entry into the cigarette market. 
     The Renegade Clause allegedly was designed to prevent current 
cigarette 
manufacturers from decreasing prices to increase market share and to bar 
new entrants 
from the market.  One part of the Renegade Clause affects tobacco 
companies (SPMs) 
that later join the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  This section creates 
strong 
disincentives for Subsequent Participating Manufacturers to increase their 
production 
and market share.  If a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer exceeds its 
1998 market 
share (or exceeds 125% of 1997 market share if that is greater), then it 
must pay into the 
settlement fund.  By maintaining historic market share, it would owe 
nothing to the 
settlement fund.  For every carton of cigarettes sold in 1999 over its 
1998 level, a SPM 
would have to pay $.19/pack into the settlement fund.  Plaintiffs contend 
this equaled 
75% of the wholesale price, which defendants do not contest.  See Br. of 
Appellants at 
14 (applying MSA  IX(C)); MSA Ex. E.  This mechanism allegedly 
discourages 
Subsequent Participating Manufacturers from underpricing the Majors to 
increase market 
share, even if they could efficiently do so.   
     Another part of the Renegade Clause affects Non-Participating 
Manufacturers 
(NPMs), cigarette companies that never sign the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement.  Non- 
Participating Manufacturers include potential new entrants into the 
tobacco market.  See 
MSA  IX(d).  But as noted, between the SPMs and the Majors, about 99% of 
the current 
cigarette producers signed the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  The 
strictures of the 
Multistate Settlement Agreement affecting NPMs were largely responsible 
for such 
participation.  Potential new entrants into the cigarette market would 
bear the burden of 
the Renegade Clause's future effects. 
     Under the Renegade Clause, if Non-Participating Manufacturers gain 
market 
share (thereby reducing the Majors' market share) the Majors may decrease 
their 
principal payments to the settlement fund.  If the Majors lose market 
share to NPMs, the 
payments to the settlement fund are not merely reduced proportionately.  
See MSA  
IX(d)(1)(A) & (B).  For example, if a participating tobacco company lost 
10% of its 
market share to a new entrant or other company that did not sign the 
Multistate 
Settlement Agreement, it may be able to reduce its payments by as much as 
24%.  See 
Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious 
Industries, 75 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 381 (2000) (making hypothetical calculations based on 
the formulas 
in MSA  IX(d)). 
 
     By enacting the Qualifying Statute set forth in the Multistate 
Settlement 
Agreement, see MSA Ex. T, a state can preclude reduced payments.  The 
model statute 
provides, 
                    Any tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to 
          consumers within the State . . . after the date of enactment of 
          this Act shall do one of following:  
 
                              (a) become a participating manufacturer (as 
that term is defined in 
               section II(jj) of the Master Settlement Agreement) and 
generally 
               perform its financial obligations under the Master 
Settlement 
               Agreement; or  
 
                              (b) (1) place into a qualified escrow fund . 
. . the following amounts 
               . . . . 
Id. 
 
The model Qualifying Statute would impose a tax on new tobacco entrants of 
approximately $.27/pack in the year 2001, rising to $.36/pack by the year 
2007.  See 
MSA Ex. T.  A Non-Participating Manufacturer only can recover its 
deposited funds: (1) 
if it is forced to pay a judgment or settlement in connection with a claim 
brought by the 
state, or (2) after the passage of twenty years free from any such 
judgments.  See id.  
Because the Non-Participating Manufacturers are not part of the 
settlement, they have no 
immunity and would be subject to similar suits brought by the State 
Attorneys General 
against the Majors (for fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation, 
conspiracy, etc.).  To 
encourage and assist the States in bringing these suits, the Multistate 
Settlement 
Agreement created a $50 million Enforcement Fund (paid for by the Majors) 
to 
investigate and sue NPMs to enforce the settlement.  See MSA  VIII(c).  
Because of the 
Qualifying Statutes, a Non-Participating Manufacturer must decide either 
to join the 
Multistate Settlement Agreement and abide by the same restrictions on 
market share 
facing a SPM (which for new manufacturers would be costly because they 
would have a 
baseline production level of zero), or face litigation and pay a tax into 
a state established 
escrow account for any potential adverse judgments. 
     Together, the Renegade Clause, the Qualifying Statutes and the 
Enforcement 
Fund allegedly create severe obstacles to market entry, or to increasing 
production and 
market share.  This is not accidental.  The Multistate Settlement 
Agreement explicitly 
proclaims its purpose to reduce the ability of non-signatory cigarette 
manufacturers to 
seize market share because of the competitive advantage accruing from not 
contributing 
to the settlement.  It declares that the agreement "effectively and fully 
neutralizes the cost 
disadvantages that the Participating Manufacturers experience vis-a-vis 
Non- 
Participating Manufacturers with such Settling States as a result of the 
provisions of this 
Agreement."  MSA  IX(d)(2)(E).     
     It is these barriers to entry and increased production that 
plaintiffs claim form an 
output cartel that violates the antitrust laws.  Because output is 
restricted and because of 
the inelastic demand for cigarettes, in part due to their addictive 
nature, the Multistate 
Settlement Agreement allegedly permitted the Majors to raise their prices 
to near 
monopoly levels Ä levels allegedly above those necessary to fund the 
settlement 
payments.  For example, assert plaintiffs, the settlement could have been 
funded by only 
a $.19/pack increase in price, but the Majors immediately raised prices by 
$.45/pack, and 
subsequently by another $.31/pack.  When this lawsuit was filed, the 
Majors had 
already raised the wholesale price of cigarettes $.76/pack since the 
adoption of the 
Multistate Settlement Agreement.  Rapid price increases of this magnitude 
would 
ordinarily permit competitors to maintain or reduce prices or prompt new 
competitors to 
enter the market.  But neither occurred, assert plaintiffs, because the 
barriers erected by 
the Multistate Settlement Agreement effectively barred entry and 
discouraged tobacco 
companies from maintaining a lower price because of the penalties for 
increased 
production. 
     Defendants contend the Multistate Settlement Agreement did not 
violate the 
antitrust laws, but even if so, they are immune under both the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, 
which protects petitioning activity, and the Parker doctrine, which 
protects sovereign acts 
of states from antitrust liability.  We turn first to the antitrust 
issues. 
                              II. 
                        Antitrust Injury 
     The defendants argue the express terms of the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement do 
not constitute an agreement to limit output in violation of the antitrust 
laws.  Plaintiffs 
counter that the Multistate Settlement Agreement's Renegade Clause, 
Qualifying 
Statutes, and Enforcement Fund, have the "unequivocal purpose and effect" 
to 
"effectuate a cartel limiting the output of cigarettes, thereby allowing 
the Majors to 
maintain supracompetitive prices," which is a per se violation of the 
antitrust laws.  Br. 
of Appellants at 29.   
     To maintain a cause of action under the Sherman Act, "[p]laintiffs 
must prove 
antitrust injury, which is to say (1) injury of the type the antitrust 
laws were intended to 
prevent and (2) that flows from that which makes defendants' acts 
unlawful."  Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1997) (emphasis in 
original).  The 
antitrust injury requirement "ensures that the harm claimed by the 
plaintiff corresponds to 
the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first 
place, and it prevents 
losses that stem from competition from supporting suits by private 
plaintiffs."  2 Philip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law  362 (Rev. ed. 1997).   
     Here, the losses plaintiffs allege resulted from explicit provisions 
of the Multistate 
Settlement Agreement, not from competition.  Plaintiffs allege the major 
tobacco 
companies formed and enforced a cartel to restrict output through the 
Multistate 
Settlement Agreement.  As a result, plaintiffs claim the Majors "imposed 
artificially high 
prices on direct purchasers," without fear of competition.  See Complaint 
 2.  Although 
this result would affect cigarette prices for retailers and consumers, as 
well as for 
wholesalers like plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has determined that direct 
buyers are the 
only parties with standing to assert damage claims under the antitrust 
laws for 
overcharges based on an output cartel.  Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 429 
U.S. 477, 734 
(1977) ("[T]he antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by 
concentrating the full 
recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by 
allowing every 
plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the 
amount it could show 
was absorbed by it.").  Although plaintiffs, as wholesalers, have alleged 
an injury, they 
must also demonstrate that the conduct which caused the injuries violated 
the antitrust 
laws. 
     An agreement which has the purpose and effect of reducing output is 
illegal under 
 1 of the Sherman Act.  Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 777 
(1999) (output 
restrictions are anticompetitive);  Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. 
of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) (where "the challenged practices 
create a 
limitation on output; our cases have held that such limitations are 
unreasonable restraints 
of trade") (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 
608-09 (1972)); 
United States v. Sacony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).  In 
California 
Dental, the Court restated that output restrictions are anticompetitive.  
At the same time, 
it refused to apply a "quick look analysis" where a local professional 
association had 
restricted certain types of advertising, but it was not obvious that the 
restrictions would 
be anticompetitive.  Remanding for further analysis, the Court 
acknowledged that a 
reduction in output was an antitrust violation.  Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 
U.S. at 777, 781.  
The Court cited with approval a case from the Court of Appeals of the 
Seventh Circuit 
which held that if  "'firms restrict output directly, price will rise in 
order to limit demand 
to the reduced supply.  Thus, with exceptions not relevant here, raising 
price, reducing 
output, and dividing markets have the same anticompetitive effects.'" Id. 
at 777 (quoting 
General Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 594-95 
(7th Cir. 
1984)).  The Court has made clear that a pure restriction on output is 
anticompetitive and 
in the absence of special circumstances, would violate the antitrust laws.  
NCAA, 486 
U.S. at 85 (recognizing that output restrictions may be permissible if 
required in order to 
market the product at all).  By limiting production, the cartel is able to 
raise prices above 
competitive levels.   
     Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice Guidelines also 
recognize that 
agreements to reduce output violate the antitrust laws.  See FTC/DOJ 
Guidelines 
 Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors,  3.2, 
reprinted in 4 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH)  20 (2000) (citing Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., 441 
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).  These regulations define output agreements as 
"hard core cartel 
agreements" and violators are prosecuted criminally without regard to 
"claimed business 
purposes, anticompetitive harms, procompetitive benefits, or overall 
competitive effects."  
Id.        
     Plaintiffs allege the agreement between the States and the Majors 
purposefully 
creates powerful  disincentives to increase cigarette production.  
Although the Multistate 
Settlement Agreement contains no explicit agreement to raise prices or 
restrict market 
share, any signatory who increases production beyond historic levels 
automatically will 
increase its proportionate share of payments to the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement.  
Normally, a company which lowers prices would be expected to increase 
market share.  
But the penalty of higher settlement payments for increased market share 
would 
discourage reducing prices here.  For this reason, signatories have an 
incentive to raise 
prices to match increases by competitors.  It appears this incentive 
structure has proven 
true.  The Majors' prices increased dramatically and simultaneously after 
signing the 
Multistate Settlement Agreement.  As noted, this included a $.45/pack 
increase just days 
after the settlement was announced, an $.18/pack increase less than a year 
later, and a 
$.13/pack increase in January of 2000.  The initial $.45 increase alone 
was more than 
double what some analysts considered necessary to fund the settlement's 
first two annual 
payments.  See Stuart Taylor Jr., All for Tobacco and Tobacco for All, 23 
Legal Times 
40, Oct. 9, 2000.    
     Defendants contend an antitrust analysis is unnecessary if we find 
either Noerr- 
Pennington or Parker immunity applies.  But plaintiffs argue that immunity 
cannot attach 
to per se antitrust violations.  We disagree.  Recently we recognized 
immunity attached 
even where the plaintiff alleged a boycott regarded as illegal per se.  
Armstrong Surgical 
Ctr. Inc., v. Armstrong Mem'l Hosp., 185 F.3d 154, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(applying 
Parker and Noerr-Pennington immunity where complaint alleged a threat of a 
boycott 
which would have constituted an antitrust violation in the absence of 
immunity), cert. 
denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000).  Similarly, in Pennington, the alleged 
conduct granted 
immunity would have been a per se violation of the antitrust laws.  United 
Mine Workers 
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 660-61 (1965). 
     Our review at this stage is limited to the allegations in plaintiffs' 
complaint.  On a 
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the issue is whether 
plaintiffs have 
properly pleaded an antitrust violation.  Plaintiffs allege that 
defendants formed an 
output cartel through the Multistate Settlement Agreement that restricts 
production and 
effectively bars entry to the cigarette tobacco market.  Plaintiffs also 
allege the cartel 
injured the tobacco wholesalers by charging artificially high prices.    
     We hold that plaintiffs have properly pleaded an antitrust violation 
by alleging 
defendants agreed to form an output cartel through the Multistate 
Settlement Agreement 
that violates  1 and  2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  But we will 
affirm if the parties 
to the Multistate Settlement Agreement are immune under the Noerr-
Pennington or the 
Parker doctrines.  We turn now to that question. 
                              III. 
                      Antitrust Immunity   
     Defendants contend they are immune from antitrust liability under 
both the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine, which immunizes parties involved in petitioning the 
government, 
and under the Parker doctrine, which immunizes sovereign state action.  
Although 
distinct doctrines, there is substantial overlap as both "work at the 
intersection of 
antitrust and governance."  The two doctrines share a fundamental 
similarity.  The 
Supreme Court has stated they are "complementary expressions of the 
principle that the 
antitrust laws regulate business, not politics; Parker protects the 
States' acts of 
governing, and Noerr the citizens' participation in government."  City of 
Columbia v. 
Omni Outdoor Adver. Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991).  The District Court 
found 
defendants immune under both.  We must affirm if defendants are immune 
under either 
doctrine.     
A.  Noerr-Pennington Immunity 
     Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, "[a] party who petitions the 
government for 
redress generally is immune from antitrust liability."  Cheminor Drugs, 
Ltd. v. Ethyl 
Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 122 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871 (1999).  
Petitioning is 
immune from liability even if there is an improper purpose or motive.  See 
E. R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 
(1961) (holding 
that even if the petitioner's sole purpose was to destroy its competition 
through passage 
of legislation, petitioner would be immune); Prof'l Real Estate Investors, 
Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993) (same).  Rooted in 
the First 
Amendment and fears about the threat of liability chilling political 
speech, the doctrine 
was first recognized in two Supreme Court cases holding federal antitrust 
laws 
inapplicable to private parties who attempted to influence government 
action - even 
where the petitioning had anticompetitive effects.  See Noerr, 365 U.S. 
127; United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  Under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, 
"mere attempts to influence the Legislative Branch for the passage of laws 
or the 
Executive Branch for their enforcement" are given immunity from the 
Sherman Act and 
other antitrust laws.  Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
U.S. 508, 510 
(1972).  The immunity reaches not only to petitioning the legislative and 
executive 
branches of government, but "the right to petition extends to all 
departments of the 
Government," including the judiciary.  Id.           
     Noerr-Pennington immunity applies to actions which might otherwise 
violate the 
Sherman Act because "[t]he federal antitrust laws do not regulate the 
conduct of private 
individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government." Omni, 
499 U.S. at 
379-80.  The antitrust laws are designed for the business world and "are 
not at all 
appropriate for application in the political arena."  Noerr, 365 U.S. at 
141.  This was 
evident in Noerr, where defendant railroads campaigned for legislation 
intended to ruin 
the trucking industry.  Even though defendants employed deceptive and 
unethical means, 
the Supreme Court held that they were still immune.  This is because the 
Sherman Act is 
designed to control "business activity" and not "political activity."  Id. 
at 129.  With this 
underpinning, the Court stated, "[Because] [t]he right of petition is one 
of the freedoms 
protected by the Bill of Rights, . . . we cannot, of course, lightly 
impute to Congress an 
intent to invade these freedoms."  Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.  The antitrust 
laws were 
enacted to regulate private business and do not abrogate the right to 
petition.      
     The scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity, however, depends on the 
"source, 
context, and nature of the competitive restraint at issue."  Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. 
v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988).  If the restraint directly 
results from 
private action there is no immunity.  See id. at 500 (where the "restraint 
upon trade or 
monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to 
private action," 
there is immunity).  Passive government approval is insufficient.  Private 
parties cannot 
immunize an anticompetitive agreement merely by subsequently requesting 
legislative 
approval.   
     Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, private parties may be immunized 
against 
liability stemming from antitrust injuries flowing from valid petitioning.  
This includes 
two distinct types of actions.  A petitioner may be immune from the 
antitrust injuries 
which result from the petitioning itself.  See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143 
(finding trucking 
industry plaintiffs' relationships with their customers and the public 
were hurt by the 
railroads' petitioning activities, yet the railroads were immune from 
liability).  Also, and 
particularly relevant here, parties are immune from liability arising from 
the antitrust 
injuries caused by government action which results from the petitioning.  
See 
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 671 (holding plaintiffs could not recover damages 
resulting from 
the state's actions); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar 
Assoc., 107 F.3d 
1026, 1037 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding Noerr gave immunity for any damages 
stemming 
from state adoption of requirements for bar admission to petitioners who 
lobbied for their 
adoption); 1 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, at  202c.  Therefore, if its 
conduct 
constitutes valid petitioning, the petitioner is immune from antitrust 
liability whether or 
not the injuries are caused by the act of petitioning or are caused by 
government action 
which results from the petitioning.  Here, we must determine whether a 
settlement 
agreement between private parties and sovereign states fits within the 
context of 
protected petitioning envisioned by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.   
     Finding that negotiating the settlement was akin to petitioning the 
government, the 
District Court held defendants immune under Noerr-Pennington.  
Specifically, it held 
that the "concerted effort by defendants to influence public officials, 
i.e., the states' 
Attorneys General, to accept a settlement in exchange for dismissing the 
numerous 
lawsuits pending against defendants is among the activities protected by 
the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine."  A.D. Bedell, 104 F.Supp.2d at 506.  We agree that 
defendants 
engaged in petitioning activity with sovereign states and are immune under 
the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine.    
     1. 
     The importance of the right to petition has been long recognized.  As 
early as 
1215, the Magna Carta granted barons the right to petition the King of 
England for 
redress.  See Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition 
Government 
for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 15, 17 
(1993) (detailing history of the right to petition from 1215 through 
colonial times, the 
constitutional convention, and today).  During our colonial period, the 
right to petition 
was widely used.  The importance of this right was fundamental - it 
guaranteed not 
merely expression but the preservation of democracy.  "The very idea of 
government, 
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet 
peaceably for 
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of 
grievances."  
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).     
     Because of the importance of the right to petition the government 
freely, and 
because "[a]ntitrust law was . . . not intended to impose a barrier 
between the people and 
their government," Noerr-Pennington immunity extends beyond filing formal 
grievances 
directly with the government.  Balt. Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 
237 F.3d 394, 
398 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding secret funding of a lawsuit brought against a 
potential 
competitor to maintain a monopoly was protected under Noerr-Pennington, 
even though 
the funding party was not a litigant). 
     In a recent survey of the application of Noerr-Pennington immunity to 
non- 
traditional petitioning, Primetime 24-Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 
Inc., 219 F.3d 
92, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
noted the 
Supreme Court has extended Noerr immunity to actions before administrative 
agencies 
and the courts, Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 508, 510-11, and that 
other courts have 
extended Noerr-Pennington immunity to include efforts to influence 
governmental action 
incidental to litigation such as prelitigation threat letters.  McGuire 
Oil Co. v. Mapco., 
Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1560 (11th Cir. 1992); Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. 
Hunt, 694 F.2d 
1358, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1982).  There would seem to be no reason to 
differentiate 
settlement from other acts associated with litigation.  See Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc. 
v. Prof'l Real Estates Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 
1991), aff'd, 508 
U.S. 49 (1993) (affirming, but not addressing whether settlement creates 
immunity 
because sham exception defeated immunity).  The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh 
Circuit has recognized the application of Noerr-Pennington immunity to 
settlements 
between private parties and state government.  In Campbell v. City of 
Chicago, 823 F.2d 
1182, 1186 (7th Cir. 1987), two cab companies were found immune from 
antitrust 
liability for their agreement to settle their lawsuits against the city in 
exchange for the 
passage of a favorable and arguably anticompetitive ordinance.  The 
settlement in 
Campbell resonates favorably with the Multistate Settlement Agreement 
here.  
     The Supreme Court has yet to speak definitively on extending 
petitioning 
immunity to settlement agreements with sovereign states.  Relying on a 
statement in 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems Inc., plaintiffs 
claim the 
Supreme Court refused to extend immunity to settlement agreements when it 
stated that a 
"consent judgment, even one entered at the behest of the Antitrust 
Division, does not 
immunize the defendant from liability for actions, including those 
contemplated by the 
decree, that violates the rights of nonparties."  441 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).  
"But in any event, 
[we are] bound by holdings, not language."  Alexander v. Sandoval, 2001 WL 
408983 
(U.S.). We believe this case is easily distinguished.  There was no 
settlement agreement 
in Broadcast Music.  Rather, Broadcast Music involved actions taken years 
after the 
resolution of a claim by private actors who claimed they were acting under 
the protection 
of a consent decree.  The Supreme Court ruled that the consent decree did 
not immunize 
the anticompetitive actions taken by private parties.  For the above 
quoted language, 
Broadcast Music relied upon Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 
U.S. 683, 
689 (1961), which did not involve Noerr-Pennington immunity.  Sam Fox 
addressed 
whether a non-participant is bound by the outcome of government antitrust 
litigation.  Id.  
Neither Broadcast Music nor Sam Fox mentioned Noerr-Pennington immunity, 
and 
neither is applicable to the facts here.  
     Plaintiffs claim a motivating purpose behind the Multistate 
Settlement Agreement 
was to create a cartel guaranteeing tobacco companies supracompetitive 
profits.  Br. of 
Appellants at 49.  Similarly, plaintiffs claim the States were motivated 
by a desire to 
share in these revenues.  But the parties' motives are generally 
irrelevant and carry no 
legal significance.  See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.  At the same time, it 
bears noting that 
the petitioning here invoked the States' traditional powers to regulate 
the health and 
welfare of its citizens.  See, e.g., Great Atlantic and Pac. Tea Co., Inc. 
v. Hugh B. 
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976) ("[U]nder our constitutional scheme the 
States retain 
'broad power' to legislate protection for their citizens in matters of 
local concern such as 
public health.").   
     In sum, we see no reason to distinguish between settlement agreements 
and other 
aspects of litigation between private actors and the government which give 
rise to 
antitrust immunity.  The rationale is identical.  Freedom from the threat 
of antitrust 
liability should apply to settlement agreements as it does to other more 
traditional 
petitioning activities.  We hold the defendants are immune under the 
Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine.       
B.  Parker Immunity 
     Having found the defendants immune under Noerr-Pennington, our 
analysis could 
end here.  But the District Court found Parker immunity, so we will 
address it as well. 
     Antitrust laws do not bar anticompetitive restraints that sovereign 
states impose 
"as an act of government."  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943); see 
also Mass. 
Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Assoc., 107 F.3d 1026, 1035 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  
The Parker doctrine relies heavily on the clarity of the State's goals and 
actions.  
"[S]tates must accept political responsibility for the actions they intend 
to undertake."  
FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992).  The key question 
is whether the 
allegedly anticompetitive restraint may be considered the product of 
sovereign state 
action.  If it is not, then even if sectors of state government are 
involved, the activity will 
not constitute "state action" under the Parker doctrine and will not 
receive immunity. 
     "State action," as defined in cases granting Parker immunity, is 
qualitatively 
different from "state action" in other contexts such as the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See 1 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, at   221.  While the Fourteenth Amendment can 
cover  
                    inadvertent or unilateral acts of state officials not 
acting 
          pursuant to state policy . . . the term "state action" in 
antitrust 
          adjudication refers only to government policies that are 
          articulated with sufficient clarity that it can be said that 
these 
          are in fact the state's policies, and not simply happenstance, 
          mistakes, or acts reflecting the discretion of individual 
          officials. 
 
Id.  Because it is grounded in federalism and respect for state 
sovereignty, this interest in 
protecting the acts of the sovereign state, even if anticompetitive, 
outweighs the 
importance of a freely competitive marketplace, especially in the absence 
of contrary 
congressional intent. 
     Without clear congressional intent to preempt, federal laws should 
not invalidate 
state programs.  "In a dual system of government in which, under the 
Constitution, the 
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract 
from their 
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its 
officers and agents 
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 
341, 351 (1943).  
While individual anticompetitive acts of state governments may be 
considered unwise or 
counterproductive, the decision to make such choices lies within the 
sovereign power of 
the states.  Congress did not intend to override important state interests 
in passing the 
Sherman Act.  "The general language of the Sherman Act should not be 
interpreted to 
prohibit anticompetitive actions by the States in their governmental 
capacities as 
sovereign regulators."  City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 
365, 374 
(1991). 
     The Sherman Act was enacted to address the unlawful combination of 
private 
businesses.  See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940) 
("The 
history of the Sherman Act as contained in the legislative proceedings is 
emphatic in its 
support for the conclusion that 'business competition' was the problem 
considered and 
that the act was designed to prevent restraints of trade which had a 
significant effect on 
such competition.").  "There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain 
state action in the 
Act's legislative history."  Parker, 317 U.S. at 313.  The Sherman Act was 
passed "in the 
era of 'trusts'  and of 'combinations' of businesses and of capital 
organized and directed to 
control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of 
goods and 
services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of public 
concern." 
Apex, 310 U.S. at 493.  Given its focus on the problems of private 
monopolies and 
combinations, it is not surprising that the Sherman Act does not set out 
to curb clearly 
defined anticompetitive state actions.  See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers 
Assoc. v. Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980).   
     When a state clearly acts in its sovereign capacity it avoids the 
constraints of the 
Sherman Act and may act anticompetitively to further other policy goals.  
See S. Motor 
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 54 (1985).  
For example, 
state governments frequently sanction monopolies to ensure consistent 
provision of 
essential services like electric power, gas, cable television, or local 
telephone service.  
But "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act 
by authorizing 
them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful."  Parker, 
317 U.S. at 351 
(states cannot authorize private parties to set a price and then enforce 
those prices 
without any evaluation of their reasonableness).  Only an affirmative 
decision by the state 
itself, acting in its sovereign capacity, and with active supervision, can 
immunize 
otherwise anticompetitive activity. 
     When it is uncertain whether an act should be treated as state action 
for the 
purposes of Parker immunity, we apply the test set forth in California 
Retail Liquor 
Dealers Association  v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980), to 
"determine 
whether anticompetitive conduct engaged in by private parties should be 
deemed state 
action and thus shielded from the antitrust laws."   Patrick v. Burget, 
486 U.S. 94, 100 
(1988).  Applying Midcal is unnecessary if the alleged antitrust injury 
was the direct 
result of a clear sovereign state act.  Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover v. 
Am. Bar Assoc., 
107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1997); Session Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor 
Mfg., Inc., 17 
F.3d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding immunity from antitrust liability 
where "injuries 
for which [the plaintiff] seeks recovery flowed directly from government 
action").  In 
Massachusetts School of Law, we held that where "the states are sovereign 
in imposing 
the bar admission requirements [the alleged anticompetitive restraints], 
the clear 
articulation and active supervision requirements . . . are inapplicable."  
107 F.3d at 1036.  
There is less need for scrutiny "[w]hen the conduct is that of the 
sovereign itself . . . 
[because] the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise."  
PTI, Inc. v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1196 (C.D. Ca. 2000).  Similarly, 
concerns about the 
legitimacy of the action are reduced.  Thus we must first decide if Midcal 
applies to the 
States' actions in negotiating and implementing the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement. 
     The Supreme Court has recognized state legislative and judicial 
action as 
sovereign under Parker.  But "[c]loser analysis is required" when the 
action is less 
directly that of the legislature or judiciary.  Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 
558, 568 (1984) 
(relying in part on Midcal).  One Court of Appeals has decided that 
executive officers 
and agencies "are entitled to Parker immunity for actions taken pursuant 
to their 
constitutional or statutory authority, regardless whether these particular 
actions or their 
anticompetitive effects were contemplated by the legislature," without the 
need for 
Midcal analysis.  Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., 
Inc., 810 F.2d 
869, 876 (9th Cir. 1987).  We have yet to address whether the acts of 
executive officials 
constitute state action that avoids Midcal analysis.  Furthermore, in this 
case, we must 
determine whether the antitrust injuries were more attributable to private 
parties than to 
government action, as was the case in Midcal. 
     1.  Direct Application of Parker 
     An argument can be made that the Multistate Settlement Agreement, and 
any of its 
anticompetitive effects, were the direct result of state government 
action.  For each 
signatory state, there was active involvement by high ranking executive 
officials and the 
agreement was subject to state court approval.  The Multistate Settlement 
Agreement was 
negotiated by Attorneys General from each state to settle existing and 
contemplated 
lawsuits.  The Multistate Settlement Agreement  required that, 
                    each Settling State that is a party to a lawsuit . . . 
and each 
          Participating Manufacturer will:  
 
                              (A) tender this agreement to the Court in 
such Settling  
               State for its approval; and  
 
                              (B) tender to the Court in such Settling 
state for 
               entry of a consent decree conforming to the 
               model consent decree attached hereto as Exhibit 
               L. 
MSA  XIII(b)(1); see also PTI, 100 F.Supp.2d at 1196.   
 
     In most cases, the state legislatures were involved as well.  
Although they lacked a 
direct role in forming or approving the Multistate Settlement Agreement, 
the legislatures 
were charged with, and responsible for, the enactment of the Qualifying 
Statutes which, 
although technically voluntary, enforce important components of the 
Multistate 
Settlement Agreement.  See MSA  IX(d)(2)(E), (F) and (G).  It is apparent 
that 
legislative enactment of the Qualifying Statutes signified state approval 
of the Multistate 
Settlement Agreement.  See Cal. Aviation Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 806 
F.2d 905, 
909 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting statutes passed afterwards can be evidence 
of pre-existing 
state policy to allow anticompetitive behavior).  In a few states, the 
legislatures played an 
even greater role by applying pressure on the Attorney General or Governor 
to bring suit 
or by passing legislation authorizing the Attorney General to bring suit 
against the 
tobacco companies.  Additionally, each branch of state government had a 
role in the 
execution or operation of the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  Under this 
analysis, one 
could find direct state action foreclosing the application of Midcal.  
     Under a different view, we focus not on the negotiation and 
consummation of the 
Multistate Settlement Agreement, but on its actual operation and resulting 
effects, since 
that is the true cause of the anticompetitive effects.  This is how the 
Supreme Court 
analyzed the behavior in Midcal.   
     In Midcal, the price setting structure that resulted in antitrust 
injury would not 
have existed but for the state regulation.  Only because of state 
legislative enactments did 
California wine producers hold power over the wholesalers to engage in 
resale price 
maintenance.  Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.  Because the actual parties 
involved in the 
anticompetitive behavior were private parties, the Supreme Court 
determined the alleged 
violation of the antitrust laws was not obvious state action and devised 
what has come to 
be known as the Midcal test.   
     We have found direct state action, without Midcal analysis, only when 
the 
allegedly anticompetitive behavior was the direct result of acts within 
the traditional 
sovereign powers of the state.  See Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1036; 
see also 
Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 111 F.3d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 1997).  
In 
Massachusetts School of Law, we held Midcal inapplicable because the state 
acted as 
sovereign in imposing bar admission requirements.  107 F.3d at 1036 
(Massachusetts 
School of Law at Andover, Inc., an unaccredited law school, had challenged 
the state 
requirement that a student graduate from an ABA accredited law school as 
an 
anticompetitive restraint).  We distinguished Midcal and its progeny as 
"inapplicable 
because they dealt with situations where private parties were engaging in 
conduct . . . 
which led directly to the alleged antitrust injury."  Id.  Similarly, in 
Zimomra, the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held Midcal inapplicable in a challenge 
to rental car 
price fixing because the city and county, and not a private actor, had the 
ultimate 
responsibility for setting rental car daily use fees and the private 
parties "had no such 
discretionary authority."  111 F.3d at 1500.  In neither case was a 
private party 
responsible for the resulting anticompetitive act; and thus there was no 
need to apply the 
Midcal analysis.      
     Although the Multistate Settlement Agreement was a negotiated 
settlement by 
State Attorneys General, and the state legislatures were responsible for 
passing the 
Qualifying Statutes to enforce important components of the agreement, 
these acts by the 
governmental parties were not the direct source of the anticompetitive 
injuries.  
Therefore, it would appear that, just as the injury in Midcal was caused 
by private parties 
taking advantage of the state imposed market structure, the 
anticompetitive injury here 
resulted from the tobacco companies' conduct after implementation of the 
Multistate 
Settlement Agreement, and not from any further positive action by the 
States.  Even 
though, as defendants argue, the Multistate Settlement Agreement created 
the cartel, this 
fact makes the case analogous to Midcal, not different.  
     The signing of the Multistate Settlement Agreement and the 
establishment of the 
output cartel are not purely private actions, nor are they entirely 
attributable to the state in 
the manner of a legislative act.  As such, this case resembles a "hybrid 
restraint" as 
discussed by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in Rice v. Norman Williams 
Co., 458 
U.S. 654, 666-67 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).    Hybrid restraints 
are not the type 
of sovereign state action found in Massachusetts School of Law or Zimomra, 
that avoid 
Midcal treatment.  Instead, hybrid restraints involve a degree of private 
action which 
calls for Midcal analysis.  See Rice, 458 U.S. at 666 ("Hybrid restraints 
of this character 
require analysis that is different from a public regulatory scheme on the 
one hand, and a 
purely private restraint on the other.") (citations omitted) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).  
Therefore, to determine if the allegedly anticompetitive sections of the 
Multistate 
Settlement Agreement were "state action" under the Parker doctrine, we 
will apply the 
Midcal analysis. 
     For the reasons expressed, namely that the antitrust injuries here 
were not caused 
by the solitary acts of the state acting in its traditional capacity, but 
were instead caused 
by hybrid acts involving private parties in the unique setting of a joint 
settlement, we 
believe this form of alleged anticompetitive restraint requires the Midcal 
analysis. 
     2.  Midcal 
     To qualify as state action under the Midcal test, "the challenged 
restraint must be 
one 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.'" 
445 U.S. at 104 
(quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 
(1978) (opinion 
of Brennan, J.)).  A government entity need not "be able to point to a 
specific, detailed, 
legislative authorization" to assert a successful Parker defense.  
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 
415.  But it must be evident that under the "clear articulation" standard 
the challenged 
restraint is part of state policy.  As the Supreme Court has stated, 
"Midcal confirms that 
while a State may not confer antitrust immunity on private persons by 
fiat, it may 
displace competition with active state supervision if the displacement is 
both intended by 
the State and implemented in its specific details."  FTC v. Ticor Title 
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 
621, 633 (1992). 
     Here, the States' reasons for bringing suits against the Majors Ä to 
reduce teenage 
smoking, address public health concerns, and recoup state health care 
expenditures Ä 
were evident and clearly articulated.  State Attorneys General and 
Governors made 
public pronouncements which received national coverage.  Other suing 
states made 
similar announcements and cited to studies demonstrating the enormous 
impact of 
cigarette smoking on health and finances.  The proclaimed goals of the 
States were 
clear. 
     As noted, the State Attorneys General and the Governors were not the 
only state 
actors involved.  The State Attorneys General took the lead in 
negotiations, but the state 
courts played an important role in approving the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement by 
issuing consent judgments and dismissing the lawsuits.  This was required 
by the 
Multistate Settlement Agreement which provided that each signatory state 
would "tender 
to the Court in such Settling State for entry of a consent decree 
conforming to the model 
consent decree" included in the agreement.  See MSA  XIII(b)(1).  The 
lawsuits were 
dismissed under the consent agreements.  The state legislatures also 
demonstrated their 
approval in most of the States by passing implementing legislation.  See 
Cal. Aviation 
Inc., 806 F.2d at 909 n.5 (noting that statutes passed afterwards are 
evidence of pre- 
existing state policy to allow anticompetitive behavior).  Even before the 
settlement, 
legislatures of some states targeted the tobacco industry by putting 
pressure on the 
Attorney General or Governor to bring suit.  In view of public 
pronouncements of the 
States' intentions and goals, along with active involvement from each 
branch of state 
government, it is evident the Multistate Settlement Agreement was backed 
by clearly 
articulated state policy. 
     The second prong of the Midcal test is whether the resulting 
antitrust violation 
was "actively supervised" by the state.  This standard is more 
problematic.  The essential 
inquiry of the "actively supervised" prong is to determine if the 
"anticompetitive scheme 
is the State's own."  FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 
(1992).  The active 
supervision prong "requires that state officials have and exercise power 
to review 
particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those 
that fail to accord 
with state policy."  Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).  "Absent 
such a program 
of supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party's 
anticompetitive 
conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party's individual 
interests."  Id. at 
100-01.  "Such active state review is clearly necessary where private 
defendants are 
empowered with some type of discretionary authority in connection with the 
anticompetitive acts (e.g. to determine price or rate structures)."  
Zimomra, 111 F.3d at 
1500.  Rubber stamp approval of private action does not constitute state 
action.  A state 
must independently review and approve the anticompetitive behavior to 
satisfy this prong 
of the Parker doctrine.  Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 ("The active supervision 
requirement 
mandates that the State exercise ultimate control over the challenged 
anticompetitive 
conduct."); Ticor, 998 F.2d at 1139.   
     Here, plaintiffs allege the Multistate Settlement Agreement primarily 
furthers the 
private tobacco companies' interests and not those of the States.  While 
we do not agree 
with this characterization, it is clear the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement empowers the 
tobacco companies to make anticompetitive decisions with no regulatory 
oversight by the 
States.  Specifically, the defendants are free to fix and raise prices, 
allegedly without fear 
of competition.  The question then is whether the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement, with 
all its duties and responsibilities, creates sufficient state supervision 
even though the 
pricing decisions are unregulated.    
     The States actively and continually monitor the implementation of 
portions of the 
Multistate Settlement Agreement.  See MSA  VII-VIII.  After requiring a 
state court 
consent decree, the Multistate Settlement Agreement also mandates state 
courts to 
maintain continuing jurisdiction over enforcement of disputes between the 
States and the 
tobacco companies.  See MSA  VII(a).  Under the Multistate Settlement 
Agreement, the 
state courts may order compliance in the form of an Enforcement Order.  
See MSA  
VII(c)(3).  If a State Attorney General believes a manufacturer has failed 
to comply with 
an Enforcement Order, it may seek an order for civil contempt or monetary 
sanction to 
force compliance.  See MSA  VII(c)(4).  Furthermore, for a period of 
seven years after 
settlement, the Attorney General of a Settling State may inspect all non-
privileged 
records of the tobacco companies, and will have access to interview 
directors, officers 
and employees upon reasonable belief of a violation of the Multistate 
Settlement 
Agreement.  See MSA  VII(g).   
     The Multistate Settlement Agreement also establishes a $50 million 
fund to assist 
the States in enforcing the Multistate Settlement Agreement.  See MSA  
VIII(c).  This 
fund is to be used 
          to supplement the States'  
 
                              (1) enforcement and implementation of the 
terms of [the Multistate 
               Settlement Agreement] and consent decrees, and  
 
                              (2) investigation and litigation of 
potential violations of laws with 
               respect to Tobacco Products.  
Id. 
 
This includes prosecution of non-signatories for those underlying "torts" 
which initially 
led the States to sue the major tobacco companies. 
     The largest responsibilities for the tobacco companies are financial.  
The 
Multistate Settlement Agreement details how and when the payments will be 
made to the 
settling states each year.  See MSA  IX.  In addition, there is a limited  
"most-favored nation" provision.  In the event a State settles with a non-
signatory 
tobacco company (NPM) on terms more favorable than the Multistate 
Settlement 
Agreement (a lower payment-per-pack amount), then all signatories will be 
entitled to a 
revision of the Multistate Settlement Agreement to at least match the new 
agreement.  
See MSA  XVIII(b)(2).  There are also significant ongoing restrictions 
placed on the 
tobacco manufacturers.  They are prohibited from taking "any action, 
directly or 
indirectly, to target Youth within any Settling State in the advertising, 
promotion, or 
marketing of Tobacco Products," MSA  III(a); they also agreed to refrain 
from using 
"any cartoon in the advertising, promoting, packaging or labeling of 
Tobacco products."  
MSA  III(b).   
     Despite these factors, we are not convinced that the States satisfy 
Midcal's "active 
supervision" prong.  This is because the States' supervision does not 
reach the parts of 
the Multistate Settlement Agreement that are the source of the antitrust 
injury.  It is the 
conduct that violates the antitrust laws that states must "actively 
supervise" in order for 
Parker immunity to attach.  
     As we recognized in Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, "an 
arrangement sponsored by the state is not necessarily state action for the 
purposes of the 
antitrust laws."  444 F.2d 1011, 1017 (3d Cir. 1971) (citing Woods 
Exploration & 
Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1294 (5th Cir. 
1971) for 
the proposition that "it is not every governmental act that points a path 
to an antitrust 
shelter").  In Wheatley, we analyzed a series of Parker cases 
demonstrating the state must 
be actively involved in establishing the rules of the market as well as in 
the 
anticompetitive activity.  Because "'states can neither authorize 
individuals to perform 
acts which violate the antitrust laws nor declare that such action is 
lawful,'" many of 
these cases of hybrid restraints turn on whether the state remains 
involved in the actual 
pricing by the regulated parties.  Wheately, 444 F.2d at 1017 (quoting 
Asheville Tobacco 
Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 
1959)). 
     Significantly, in Midcal, the State of California enacted a pricing 
system for the 
wine industry.  Because the State did not exercise direct control over the 
resulting prices 
set by the private actors, and did not review the reasonableness of the 
prices, the 
Supreme Court found insufficient "active supervision" to qualify as state 
action.  Midcal, 
445 U.S. at 105-06.  Therefore, there was no immunity for setting 
anticompetitive prices 
under this system.  Id. 
     In Midcal, the challenged "restraints" were state statutes on pricing 
and resale 
price maintenance.  But there were several other ways in which the State 
of California 
regulated the wine industry.  See, e.g., Cal. Bus & Prof. Stat. Ann.   
25600-67 (West 
1964).  California actively supervised when, where, and to whom wine or 
other 
alcoholic beverages could be sold, the markings and signs on labels, 
penalties for 
underage use, and advertisements, including prohibiting advertising to 
minors.  This 
"supervision" was not cited in Midcal because it did not constitute part 
of the 
anticompetitive restraint at issue.  Under Parker, a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme 
would be immune from antitrust liability because the "State would 
'displace unfettered 
business freedom' with its own power," Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106.  But the 
Supreme Court 
in Midcal was silent about the impact of other regulatory provisions in 
the California 
Code denoting, we believe, the absence of a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme in this 
sense.   
     Since Midcal, other courts have found that if a state creates or 
sanctions a 
monopoly or cartel through its sovereign powers, but does not regulate the 
resulting 
prices, the resulting anticompetitive behavior should not be granted 
immunity.  In 
Wheately, we held that because the Virgin Islands Alcoholic Beverages Fair 
Trade Law 
did not grant the power to "approve, disapprove, or modify the prices 
fixed by private 
persons," the program could not meet the active supervision prong of 
Midcal and was not 
immune under Parker.  In Asheville Tobacco, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit 
held that where a state statute authorized the creation of local tobacco 
boards to regulate 
tobacco sales at auctions, and where the states did not continue to 
supervise the decisions 
of these boards, the board's actions were not protected by Parker 
immunity.  This 
principle has also been applied in state granted monopoly cases.  In Gas 
Light Co. of 
Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), the Court of 
Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit found a utility which had been given a monopoly by 
the state was 
entitled to Parker immunity only because its prices were regulated 
extensively by the 
state through a process of full adversarial hearings.   
     In each of these cases, the decision by the state to allow, or even 
to create, an 
anticompetitive scheme did not establish immunity.  As a leading antitrust 
treatise has 
recognized, "A state may be free to determine for itself how much 
competition is 
desirable, provided that it substitutes adequate control wherever it has 
substantially 
weakened competition." Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, at  221 (citing 
Wheatley, 
Asheville Tobacco, and Georgia Power).  Under this jurisprudence, only 
when the state 
approves and actively supervises the results of the anticompetitive scheme 
does Parker 
immunity attach.  
      As noted, some provisions of the Multistate Settlement Agreement 
actively 
regulate the tobacco companies, like those imposing advertising 
restrictions.  But these 
provisions have no effect on pricing or production and thus do not 
regulate the challenged 
anticompetitive conduct.  Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.  In contrast, the 
anticompetitive 
restraints in the Multistate Settlement Agreement that permit the tobacco 
companies to 
maintain an output cartel are the Renegade Clause and, arguably, the 
resulting Qualifying 
Statutes.   
     The States here are actively involved in the maintenance of the 
scheme, but they 
lack oversight or authority over the tobacco manufacturers' prices and 
production levels.  
These decisions are left entirely to the private actors.  Nothing in the 
Multistate 
Settlement Agreement or its Qualifying Statutes gives the States authority 
to object if the 
tobacco companies raise their prices.  In fact, it appears these increases 
have already 
happened.  As noted, the Majors have raised their prices sharply and 
uniformly since the 
implementation of the Multistate Settlement Agreement  Ä according to 
plaintiffs, by 
50% since 1997.  See Complaint at  36.  These price increases have not 
been monitored 
or regulated by the States.  The Multistate Settlement Agreement imposes 
no restrictions 
on pricing or provisions to temper the effects of the output cartel.  
Under this set of 
facts, there is insufficient evidence of active supervision of the 
allegedly anticompetitive 
restraints to satisfy this prong of Midcal. 
     Although the Multistate Settlement Agreement is the product of a 
"clearly 
articulated" state policy, because the States do not "actively supervise" 
the  
anticompetitive restraints, the participants are not entitled to Parker 
immunity.
     3.   
     The question of Parker immunity's applicability is a difficult one.  
As noted, we 
hold we must apply the Midcal test.  Although the States satisfy Midcal's 
"clear 
articulation" prong, they fail the second prong requiring them to actively 
supervise the 
anticompetitive restraints causing injury.  Because private participants 
in state action 
enjoy Parker immunity only to the extent the States enjoy immunity, the 
defendants are 
not shielded by Parker.  Therefore, consistent with the Supreme Court's 
treatment of 
hybrid restraints, we hold defendants are not immune under the Parker 
immunity 
doctrine. 
                             IV.   
                     Constitutional Claims 
     In its brief, and again at oral argument, plaintiffs asked us to find 
the Multistate 
Settlement Agreement unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause or the 
Compact 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  But plaintiffs did not allege 
constitutional 
violations in their amended complaint, nor did the District Court address 
them.  
Therefore, these claims will not be addressed on appeal.  Mahone v. 
Addicks Utility 
Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 935 (5th Cir. 1988) ("It is black-letter law that 
'[a] motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) is to be 
evaluated only on the pleadings.'") (quoting O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 
605, 608 (5th 
Cir.1985)); N.A.M.I. v. Essex County Bd. of Freeholders, 91 F.Supp.2d 781, 
787 n.7 
(D.N.J. 2000) ("This Court need not consider claims that have not been 
pleaded in the 
complaint."); 5A Charles Alan  Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and 
Procedure  1356 (1990).  "'Absent exceptional circumstances, an issue not 
raised in the 
district court will not be heard on appeal.'"  Walton v. Mental Health 
Ass'n of 
Southeastern Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Altman v. 
Altman, 653 F.2d 
755, 758 (3d Cir.1981)).  When exceptional circumstances exist or to avoid 
"manifest 
injustice," issues not previously raised may be heard to protect the 
public interest.  See id.  
No such interests are present.  Although the Cato Institute, amicus curiae 
for plaintiffs, 
argues the constitutional claims, "new issues raised by an amicus are not 
properly before 
the court" in the absence of exceptional circumstances.  General Eng'g 
Corp. v. Virgin 
Islands Water and Power Auth. Caribbean Energy Co., Inc., 805 F.2d 88, 92 
(3d Cir. 
1986) (citing United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 
(1981)).  These 
constitutional claims are not properly before us.   
                              V.   
                           Conclusion 
     The Multistate Settlement Agreement creates novel issues because of 
the 
uniqueness of the instrument Ä involving forty-six states and over 98% of 
an industry.  
Although plaintiffs have properly pleaded an antitrust injury, the right 
to petition the 
government is paramount.  Therefore, we hold defendants immune from 
antitrust liability 
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.  But we find no immunity under the 
Parker 
doctrine.  We will not address the constitutional issues.   
     We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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                              /s/ Anthony J. Scirica 
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